Systemic risks and financial consolidation in the EU: Challenges for prudential policy. by Heremans, Dirk
Tijdschrift voor Economie en Management 
Vol. XLVII, 3, 2002 
Systemic Risks and Financial 
Consolidation in the E.U. 
Challenges for Prudential Policy 
Cente;  for Econoiiiic Studies, 
KULeuven, Leuven. I.  INTRODUCTION 
In recent months the financial system has been shocked by serious 
upheavals. Insurance companies have been hit hard by declines in 
stock market prices reducing their reserves to a critical level. As sollie 
insurance entities suddenly had to sell off stocks in order to meet their 
policy liabilities, prices in the stock market dropped sharply affecting 
also the solvency of other insurance undertakings. In the process also 
the position of other financial intermediaries, which were linked to 
insurance entities within the framework of financial conglomerates, 
had become endangered. From a rather unexpected perspective  sud- 
denly a system-wide crisis lurked behind the corner. 
Sectord borders as we!!  as coiufitry borders between financial inter- 
mediaries  have  been  gradually  fading  away  in  the  consolidation 
process resulting from deregulation, innovation and internationalisa- 
tion of the financial system. In particular  the financial sector in the 
European Union, being in the transition towards an integrated Euro- 
wide financial market and the introduction of a single currency, is 
undergoing major adjustments. The shift from an essentially bank- 
based intermediation system to a more market-oriented systems entails 
the consolidation of financial entities across sectors and across borders. 
It raises particular questions as to the threat of European-wide system 
risks as monetary policy is attributed to a European Central Bank, but 
prudential policy  remains  the domain of the  national  supervisory 
authorities. 
In the present contribution the focus is on financial consolidation 
and the particular role of financial conglomerates. First, starting from 
an analysis of financial consolidation in the E.U., the implications for 
E.U. wide  systemic risks will be investigated.  Second, remaining 
mainly within the E.U. perspective the challenges for prudential reg- 
ulation and supervision are to be explored. 
IS.  FINANCIAL CONSOLIDATION AND SYSTEM RISKS 
The threat to the stability of the financial system depends on the occur- 
rence of negative financial disturbances and on the presence of nega- 
tive externalities such that economic shocks take a system-wide char- 
acter'.  Given  the  ongoing  changes  in  the  financial  landscape 
characterised by consolidation, the question arises how these do affect the probability of financial shocks and the system-wide transinission 
of these disturbances. To  deal with this questioil a prior investigation 
into the patterns of financial consolidation and into its u~nderlying  driv- 
ing forces is in order. 
A.  Cot~solidation  and Firzancinl Conglomerates 
The financial landscape worldwide has witnessed increasing consoli- 
dation, particularly in the recent period between  1990 and 2000. In 
Europe it is an even inore recent phenoiiienon  as two thirds of the 
inerger and acquisition activities in the financial sector occurred dur- 
ing the last three years. Only some countries such as Gennany, Italy 
and to a certain extent Spain escaped until now fmm this conso!ida- 
tion process, as is illustrated by the market shares for the largest banks 
in Table 1. 
About seventy percent coilsisted of domestic mergers within the 
same financial sector, while domestic cross-sector mergers accounted 
for fifteen percent of all the deals. When including also the cross-border 
cross-sector mergers, it can be estimated that about twenty percent of 
all deals gave rise to the emergence of financial conglomerates, broad- 
ening the scope of banking to securities and insurance activities. 
The emergence of heterogeneous financial groups combiiling insti- 
tutions fioin different financial sectors is, coinpared to the U.S., some- 
what inore representative for the European experience. The regulatory 
franleworli in the E.U. allowing for uiliversal banking has been inore 
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Sozwce  Group of Ten (2001) conductive to cross-industry consolidation of commercial banking, 
market  investment services and insurance activities. Moreover, the 
financial market integration process in the E.U. and the introduction 
of the Euro contributed to a climate of deregulation and increased 
competition putting downward pressures on commercial banks' prof- 
its. Banks had to develop new business and widen their range of prod- 
ucts to compensate for the decrease in their intermediation margins 
(See National Bank of Belgium (2002)). They shifted their activities 
from deposit collection to asset management, and to a lesser extent 
from lending to investment banking. 
The shift from traditional  bank intermediation to  market  inter- 
mediation, which has led to disinterinediation  in the U.S. financial 
sector, resulted in the particular European regulatory context in uni- 
versal banking and financial conglomeration. Moreover, the ageing of 
the  population  and the  fiscal  advantages to  long-term  savings  in 
Europe, induced the banks to move into insurance activities. 
In the E.U. between 1999 and 2002 cross-sector mergers and acqui- 
sitions counted for one third of all M&A activities in the financial sec- 
tor. Using their  extensive retail networks banks in the E.U. have 
acquired a dominant position in asset management, accounting  in 
many countries for a share of 80 percent of total collective investment 
services provided. A distinguishing feature in Europe has been the rel- 
ative  importance  of  cross-industry  acquisition  of  insurance  firms 
enabling conglomerates pairing banking concerns with insurance com- 
panies ("banc assurance") to emerge. In Belgium and the Netherlands 
the cross-industly deals were even more important than the mergers 
within the same financial sector (see Group of Ten (2001)). 
Driving forces behind "Financial  Conglomeration" are expected 
cost and revenue synergies derived from common resources and client 
base. As they lead to increasing concentration also market power rents 
by capitalizing on brand names and reputation may be seen as a major 
motive. 
The revenue synergies may be documented for the 50 largest banks 
in Europe. Non-interest incomes increased from 41,9 percent in 1997 
to 57 percent of total net income in 2000 (ECB (2002)). Evidence on 
cost synergies, however, is more difficult to discover, as they often 
may be realised only after considerable time lags. 
Conglomerates in the financial sector, however, are emerging at the 
same time as other conglomerates in industrial sectors are disappear- 
ing, pointing to a puzzle (See National Bank of Belgium  (2002)). Traditionally holding companies have been rationalised by their bet- 
ter access to capital markets. Due to capital market inlperfections they 
are in a better position to attract funds that they reallocate to the dif- 
ferent firms within the group. As capital markets become more effi- 
cient, conglomerates are bound to decline in importance. Does the 
same reasoning not apply to financial holding companies and con- 
glomerates? 
Somewhat paradoxically, however, the new financial market disci- 
pline is contributing to the formation of conglomerates in the finan- 
cial sector. As capital is a scarce resource financial market discipline 
puts increasing pressure on the market participants to generate stronger 
risk-adjusted returns. They have to manage their risks more efficiently. 
.  .  .  .  . .  A sigr,lf;,cant  poten:ia!  far risk &ii;ersicLcation exists in aciiiiiring 
that are not highly correlated with existing risks. This may imply a bias 
towards moving into cross-sectoral activities within the framework of 
a financial conglomerate. To  document  this potential  for revenue 
diversification benefits of financial conglomerates, further investiga- 
tion of the various financial risks to which the different financial insti- 
tutions are exposed is in order. 
B. Financial Risks of Financial Institutions and Conglomerates 
Financial fragility depends on the impact of shocks on financial insti- 
tutions and markets, as well as on the propagation of shocks through- 
out the financial system. In this section the exposure of individual 
financial institutions and groups to the impact of financial shocks will 
be investigated. How is their likelihood of failure affected in the new 
financial environment? 
A financial institution faces many types of financial risk. Overall 
credit risk, market risks, and liq~lidity  risk are generally expected to 
decrease within the euro-area, whereas operational risk is likely to 
worsen at least in the short nu1 (see ECB (1999)). Hence, financial 
market integration in the E.U. and the single currency may on bal- 
ance not have aggravated the fragility  of individual  financial inter- 
mediaries. Deeper and more liquid financial markets reduce the like- 
lihood of liquidity problems. Credit risks are more easily transferred 
to the financial market through issuing corporate bonds, securitisation 
of loans and the increasing use of credit derivatives. 
The question arises, however, whether this picture is not modified 
by the financial consolidation process that is simultaneously occurring in the E.U.?  As argued above financial consolidation is being induced 
by increased market competition and disintennediation reflecting the 
shift froin a still largely bank-intennediated  system in Europe to a 
more market-based financial system. The traditional deposit-loan iiiter- 
mediation technology, internalising liquidity risks and credit rislts on 
the balance  sheets,  is  substituted  for  off-balance  sheet  activities. 
It involves the transfer of some of these risks to the financial inarket 
which in a broad sense is likely to be risk reducing. Liquidity risks 
diminishes as the  share of deposits  in total  funding decreased  to 
35 percent  of total liabilities for the largest banks in Europe. Also 
negotiable  liquid  assets  count  for  a  larger  share  of  total  assets. 
As banks' assets have become more liquid and marketable, the lilteli- 
llGQd =f  liquidity prGb]eF,s  decline, 
Moreover, the consolidation wave is also induced by financial mar- 
ket pressures to improve the risks-adjusted returns of the portfolios of 
financial intermediaries. By pooling similar risk-types within a larger 
portfolio, large banks benefit  from the law of large numbers. For 
instance, by geographically diversifying their loan portfolio through 
cross-border mergers, banks may reduce credit rislts and lower their 
revenue variability. 
On the other hand, the financial finns' exposure to financial mar- 
kets is also increasing market risks. Increasing reliance on liquidity 
through the wholesale inarket and the use of complex inarket instnl- 
iilents, may under difficult market  circumstances  lead to potential 
larger shifts in liquidity. Moreover, such shocks are likely to more 
quickly  impair  the  creditworthiness  of  a bank than  would  occur 
through the deterioration in a loan book that is not marked to market 
(see Group of Ten (2001)). 
Whatsoever, the risk profile of comrnercial banks, which tradition- 
ally consisted in about 60 percent credit risk, 20 percent market inter- 
est risk and 20 percent operational risk, is certainly changing. 
Similar observations are to be made for consolidation within finan- 
cial conglomerates. As deposits are substituted for mutual funds and 
loans for corporate bonds, banlts have been setting up or acquiring 
mutual f~~i~ds,  as well as investment banking and securities firms. 
The mirror image is that the shift towards non-banking activities by 
large financial conglomerates has introduced new risk considerations. 
Asset management and investment banking activities are more vul- 
nerable to operational risks includillg processing, execution or deliv- 
ery errors or fraud through market manipulation, insider trading or falsified accounts (see National Bank of Belgium (2002)). The new 
sources of income are highly dependent on asset prices, which inay be 
quite volatile in financial markets. 
The iinpostant question remains whether  in the new environment 
revenue diversification benefits are obtained by coinbilling these dif- 
ferent types of risk within a holding company? In principle, by engag- 
ing in cross-sector activities and prod~~c'i  divcrsificalion, e.g. by  com- 
bining more cyclical earnings fi-om bank products with more stable 
revenues from insurance premiums, the risk profile inay improve. 
More generally, the net effect will depend 011  the earnings volatility 
of tlie line of business that is added and its coirelation with the risk 
of the existing business lines. 
T--J:*:  11--  ..:.l- 
l  l  Livilaiiy  I ISI~  types  differ  among  financial  intermediaries 
according to the finailcial activities involved. The key risk types of 
banking are credit risk and liquidity risk. Securities brokerage is most 
vulnerable to inarket and liquidity risks. Insurance depends mainly on 
technical risks. In this respect, it has been found that inarket and credit 
risks tend be highly correlated, as is also confinned by the huge losses 
on stock portfolios and the loan book in the recent period. Technical 
and operational risks are much less correlated with other risks. Hence, 
the underlying benefits of diversification Inay differ according to the 
business lines that are combined (see The Joint Forum (2001))2. 
It confirms previous  simn~~lation  studies mostly cond~~cted  for the 
U.S. giving clear evidence that the banking-insurance combination 
should iinprove the risk profile, whereas the results are much more 
mixed  for  the  banking-securities  firms  and  other  combinations. 
It should be added that these results reflect average outcomes for the 
sectors and business lines concerned. On a company basis particular 
coinbii~ations  Inay be inore beneficial, as is found in  case by case 
studies3. 
In reality, however, poteiltial benefits as derived froin economies of 
scope in the field of risk management, inay not materialize. As finan- 
cial conglomerates have to manage different types of risk, risk con- 
troi lnay becoine very complex. The risk control structures of differ- 
ent business lines, that traditionally focus on their own specific risks 
ill  banking,  securities  dealing and  insurance  have  to be  nlerged. 
Eventually this difficulty may be overcome by advances in risk man- 
agement techniques. 
The complexity of financial conglomerates Inay also render inarket 
discipline ineffective and induce more risk taking. Such a behaviour, however, is less likely when inarket power rents and synergies are 
increasing franchise values of financial intermediaries. Hence, it is 
observed that the beneficial influence of financial congloinerates is 
more likely in the E.U., where there is considerable scope for realiz- 
ing economies given the current financial structure (see Group of Ten 
(2001)). 
C. Systemic Financial Risks 
The financial system contains powerful propagation mechanism that 
can amplify financial shocks. Whether financial shocks, as discussed 
before have systemic ramifications depend on the "width"  and the 
CLJ-..LIL~  -r~i -i---i--  :--  LI--  c  :-l  --J  LL- :---& ---- -c 
UGI)Lll  U1 LllGSG  bIlUtiKb 111  LllG  llllillltilill bybLGIlI illlU LIIG  Illlt)UILillILG U1 
their effects on the real sector. 
The "width"  measures the fraction of the financial system that is 
simultaneously affected at impact. In this respect a common shock 
affecting several financial intermediaries has a wider impact than an 
idiosyncratic  shock due to the failure of one financial institution. 
The increasing reliance on market activities increases the fragility of 
financial intermediaries to common shocks originating in financial 
markets. 
"Depth refers to the fraction of the system that is subsequently 
affected during the transmission phase. In this respect banks are inore 
subject to interconnections than securities firms and insurance com- 
panies (see Heremans (2000)). Deposit loan activities are especially 
vulnerable to the contagious transmission of shocks. In a world where 
deposits are insured, however, an idiosyncratic shock threatening an 
individual bank may no longer lead to the traditional mechanisms of 
a run by depositors on banks in trouble. Contagion is more likely to 
occur at the wholesale level through unsecured deposits, in particular 
in the interbank market. Also greater reliance  on financial markets, 
increasing integration and linkages of financial markets are facilitat- 
ing the propagation  of financial shocks. A decline in  asset prices 
caused by  heavy selling by weakened financial firms hurts the bal- 
ance sheets of other firms holding the same asset. 
Finally, in order to have substantial effects on the macro-economy 
the contagious shocks should either: 
disrupt the payments system through failures in the settlement of 
payments or through panic runs on banks by depositors; - disrupt credit flows through the failure of credit institutions; 
- provoke a collapse in asset prices or markets that fail to clear 
when large volumes of assets are liquidated simultaneously (see 
Berger e.a. (2000)). 
In the still largely bank intermediated systems in the E.U., channels 
of contagion involving banks remain important, in particular through 
the interbank market. The reliance on interbank financing is increas- 
ing,  diminishing  the  probability  of  individual  bank  failures,  but 
increasing the risk of total collapse of the banking system. 
As given in Table 2, with a sizable proportion of about 30 percent 
of the balance sheet total interbank positions link the banks closely 
together. Domestic i~lterhnli  !ending still remains the mcst imp~rtant 
component, so that systemic risk is primarily a national concern. Cross 
border interbank lending of banks operating in European countries with 
other European banks is increasing rapidly as is illustrated in Table 3. 
The interbank activities with banks outside the E.U. are declining. It is 
explained by the advent of the Euro and the development  of Euro 
TABLE 2 
hterbank Positions 
(percentage of balance sheet total) 
Assets  Liabilities  Net Position 
Belgium  1995  33,O  40,7  -7,7 
200 1  24,O  31,s  -7,8 
Europe  2001  26,6  30,9  -4,3 
Sozlrce: ECB (2002) 
TABLE 3 
Cross border inter-bank lending of  banks operatzng in Ez~i-opean  countries 
(in billion  dollar^) 
Europe 
Non-Europe 
Source: Group of Ten (2001) inoney markets reducing the likelihood of national liquidity failures. 
On the other hand, banks  are increasingly  exposed to shoclts origi- 
nating beyond their national borders, increasiilg the threat for national 
dish~rbances  having Euro-wide effects. 
Table 4 indicates that balks in the sinaller European countries rely 
inore on cross border interbank lendiilg than baillts in the larger coun- 
tries, exception made for the U.K. Banks in the U.K. deal relatively 
more with non-E.U. banks making them more sensitive to non-E.U. 
shocks. 
How have these interbank positions  been affected by the consoli- 
dation process  in the financial sector? D~le  to the intenlalisation of 
interbank lending, banking concentration may reduce the volume of 
domnestic interbank transactions. This is being observed in Relgii.~m, 
as given in Table 2, where a significant decrease in the reliance on 
interbank transactions as the result of the wave of mergers and acqui- 
sitions has occurred. Also the net reliance  on the interbank market, 
the assets being one fourth smaller than the liabilities  can be coin- 
pletely contributed to the four largest banks. The net proposition of the 
other banks is practically in equilibrium. This net borrowing positioil 
inaltes the larger baillts inore vulnerable to potential  contagion risk. 
It is, however, counterbalanced by more secured lending on the basis 
of collateral. Major credit institutions in Belgium are substituting for 
nearly half of their operations repurchase agreeinents for straight loans 
TABLE 4 
Crass border ~nterbarlk  lendiig of bn~dis  operating 717  Ezu-opean cozlntrres 1vztJ7 










U.K. in the interbank market, while other banks rely  almost entirely on 
unsecured operations (see National Bank of Belgium (2002)). 
I11  what other ways does consolidation  affect system risks? The 
acquisitioil of smaller financial players by larger firms may be belle- 
ficial to financial stability. Increasing competition ill a Emopean-wide 
market is threatening the survival of smaller banks. These problems 
may be taken care-off by consolidating t11el11  within larger financial 
intermediaries without disi-upting the stability of the financial system. 
The mirror image, however, is that by their sheer size large finan- 
cial institutions present systemic rainifications tlxough the "width" of 
the financial shock when they are in trouble. They may be "too big 
too fail",  liquidate on discipline effectively raising the risk of large 
potential accidents. 
Large financial coilgloinerates give rise also to additional concerns 
about system rislts d~le  to the risk of contagion between the different 
business lines involved. In principle, an institutional  stn~cture  con- 
sisting of subsidiaries with separate capital bases could liinit conta- 
gion. In practice, problems in one business may contaminate other 
business lines through substantial intragroup transactions or even by 
sheer reputational contagion. Hence, probleins in non-bank activities 
such as insurance aiid securities dealings may become a source of sys- 
temic risk as they spillover to the deposit-taking subsidiary. As men- 
tioned earlier the shift towards non-banking activity of large financial 
conglolnerates  in Europe, in particular towards asset management, 
could have increased both the impact and propagation of shoclts from 
hnilllcial markets. In addition, when due to a problein in one country 
a cross border financial conglomerate is in distress, these problems 
are more easily spread to other countries. 
Empirical evidence links consolidatioil with increases in  interde- 
pendencies among large financial institutions. In the U.S. the large 
coinplex banking organisations (LCBO's) have become more vl~lner- 
able to overall inarltet conditioils in the secoi~d  half of the 1990s. It is 
also found that consolidation among relatively dissimilar iiistitutions 
has tcilded to increase i~lterdependellcies  somewhat more than has 
consolidation among firms with more similar degree of complexity 
(see De Nicolo, Kwast (2001)). 
For Europe the evidence is veiy limited. Direct channels of inter- 
dependence are ineasured through the average of the cross correla- 
tions of returns  as measured between pairs of the largest financial 
institutions4. In  Europe  these  conelations  may  have  increased somewhat since 1997. They have become also more volatile. The cor- 
relations  are particularly higher in periods of financial crisis and of 
economic downturn (see Heremans (2002)). 
Looking in each country at the average of the cross correlations of 
returns, as measured between pairs of the largest financial institutions, 
they  are  generally  stronger than  the  European-wide  correlations. 
Hence, country specific patterns  still dominate the potential for sys- 
temic crises. However, as the countrywide correlations in the more 
recent years are gradually converging towards the European-wide cor- 
relations,  they  may  be  indication  of  the  increasing  potential  of 
European-wide systemic risks. 
Financial conglomerates are not only directly interdependent, but 
also indirectly through conelated exposures to non-financial sectors 
and financial markets. In particular  the shift of large financial con- 
glomerates  in  Europe towards  asset  management  may  then  have 
increased not only the impact, but also the propagation of shocks. 
Finally, whereas for financial conglomerates the impact on indi- 
vidual and aggregate risk may be unclear, they certainly have ren- 
dered crisis management more difficult. The failure of an illiquid but 
still solvent financial intermediary can be prevented by emergency 
liquidity assistance. The complexity and lack of transparency due to 
intragroup transactions within a financial conglomerate make it more 
difficult to distinguish between illiquidity and insolvency problems. 
If necessary, systemic ramifications should be avoided by winding 
down insolvent institutions in an orderly way. Complex corporate 
stixctclres ilivolving different legal entities preveiit a timely windiilg 
down of conglomerates. 
To conclude, when the potential diversification benefits from con- 
solidation could reduce the probability of financial shocks, the mirror 
image however is, that when a failure does occur the impact of a shock 
will be larger. It certainly warrants closer attention of policy makers 
to the implication of the changing financial landscape for system risk. 
111.  CHALLENGES FOR PRUDENTIAL POLICY 
Because of the consolidation process the systemic costs of a financial 
institution's  failure, although not the  liltelihood  of a failure have 
increased. How does it affect the present regulatory system for the 
financial sector? Are there adjustments to be made? First, an answer to these questions has to framed within the general 
context of the present regulatory crisis, involving a shift froin stl-uc- 
hlral to pl~ldential  regulation. 
Second, the more specific challenge for the main prudential instru- 
ments, i.e. capital adequacy and solvency regulation, has to be further 
explored. 
Finally, it also questions the whole set-up of the supervisory archi- 
tecture based upon regulation by national authorities and separate 
supervision for banks, securities firms and insurance companies. 
A. Deregulation and prudential reregzilation 
Internationalisationj financial in~ovations  and the overa!!  dereg~!ation 
wave since the 1970s have led to financial sector liberalisation by 
removing structural regulatory  barriers.  They were  driving forces 
behind the re-emergence of financial conglomerates. 
Historically, however, in the aftermath of the Great Depression in 
the  1930s, in order to limit for the future the contagious spread of 
bankruptcies in the financial system that had occurred, structural reg- 
ulation had been introduced. Unbridled competition was  seen as a 
major threat to the stability of the financial sector. The scope of activ- 
ities of financial intermediaries was  limited in many countries by 
legally separating commercial banking from securities and insurance 
activities. Before the crisis, commercial banks had acted as securities 
firms as well as depository instihitions. They had an incentive to take 
on more risky  activiiies in financial markets and earn investment- 
banking fees, the risk being shifted in part to the deposit holders. 
In order to limit these risky activities and to reduce the risk of conta- 
gion, product line restrictions and in some countries also geographic 
restrictions were introduced (see Heremans (1999)). 
In recent decennia as it became clear that these regulatioils conveyed 
benefits to private financial institutions by protecting them also against 
o~itside  competition, they were gradually removed. In the E.U. dereg- 
ulation concurred with the financial market integration process. The 
emphasis shifted towards competitive efficiency, level playing field 
considerations and also individual investor protection. Financial system 
stability no longer came into the picture as the primary goal. 
Although a direct connection between  financial liberalisation and 
financial crises is difficult to establish, banking systems have experi- 
enced significant problems in the last two decades. According to an IMF study, of the  181 member countries  133 have experienced  sig- 
nificant banking problems. Aniong these 36 countries suffered from a 
real financial crisis (see Lindgren, Garcia, Saal (1996)). 
The inajor underlying problein was that in the ineantiine govern- 
inents had  also established safety nets for financial iiistitutions in 
trouble. Central banks provide emerging liquidity assistance though 
developing  their  lender  of  last resort  f~~nction.  In  addition public 
authorities also intervene by  guaranteeing some fiilailcial liabilities 
and by  directly protecting  investors through "Deposit  Insurance". 
When the government provides  such a safety net it tempts financial 
iiistitutions to pursue high-risk strategies. Also, when they are cov- 
ered by deposit insurance, depositors have less incentive to inonitor 
and discipline financial institutions. Instead of spending rubstantia! 
ainouilts of their National Product on rescuing ex post ailing financial 
institutions,  preventive  government  ii~terventions  are  in  order  to 
counter ex ante these moral hazard effects. This "reregulation", how- 
ever, does not require a returil to  structurally limiting competition 
inalting financial conglomeration impossible. It should attempt to rec- 
oncile market efficiency with safety and stability by resorting to pre- 
ventive ilieasures of the prudential type5. 
The idea behind these pmdential policies is that financial problems 
are most often due to the lack of establishing adequate interi~al  con- 
trol procedures by fiiiancial instih~tions  to contain the rislt of new or 
expanded activities, and the failure of authorities to supervise them. 
Hence, by priority a culhlre of internal governance of rislt behaviour 
is to be developed. It shoiild therelure be supplementecl by solvency 
and capital adequacy standards, as well as by  asset restrictions  and 
diversification lules. An impostant role is also to be given to external 
governance through inarltet discipline. This inarltet transpareiicy is to 
be  sustained  by  accouilting  standards  and  disclosure  rules  (see 
Dewatripont, Tirole (1993)). 
Financial congloinerates  present particular  problems with respect 
to the existing safety net policies. If banking activities caimot be sep- 
arated froin the non-bank past, the potential safety nct is stretched to 
the  non-bank  activities  increasing  the  problem  of  moral  liazard. 
In addition non-banlts that are part of the group would gain a com- 
petitive advantage compared to those that are not past of a financial 
conglomerate (see Group of Tell (200 1)). 
Limiting the focus to the implications of financial congloinerates for 
financial system stability, it has to be f~~rther  investigated whether additional pntdential policies are required to ensure not only that they 
are better able to withstand shocks, and that transparency is increased, 
but more importantly to reduce the likely contagioil once they are in 
trouble. 
B. Capital Adeqzlncy al7d  Solvericy Regz~latioli 
Capital and reserves in the foiln of provisions made by financial inter- 
mediaries provide the necessaiy buffer against losses. For securities 
firnl's capital is the priinary cushion against losses arising from mar- 
lcet, operational and credit risks. They generally do not establish gen- 
eral reserves for expected losses. It is different for baillts where cap- 
ital is supplemented by  loan loss reserves that are 21s~  available t~ 
help to cover potential credit risks. The iilsurance sector mainly relies 
upon technical provisions to cover future policy  liabilities  deriving 
froin technical  risks. Additionally  solvency  margins  are  imposed 
requiring a certain ainount of capital as a buffer against losses arising 
from all ltinds of reinailling risks. 
Equity capital requirements thus aim at providing a necessaly cush- 
ion against losses. They are needed since shareholders may want to 
benefit from the leverage effect increasing their reh~ms  on equity by 
providing  as little capital as necessary. Froin a pntdential point of 
view, however, the incentive effects of capital requirements are more 
important. When financial intermediaries hold a larger amount of cap- 
ital they have more to loose in case of failure. It provides the right 
iilcelitives iu linlii excessive risk taking. 
The a~nount  of regulatory capital affects capital costs and hence 
also  the  coinpetitive  positions  of  the  financial  intermediaries. 
For banks in particular required capital directly deteimines their com- 
petitive position on the credit market. Bank capital serves as the basis 
for the risk adjusted pricing of loans. Hetlce, the trade-off between 
the goals of financial stability and coinpetitiveness reveals to be espe- 
cially difficult requiring govenlmeilt intervention. 
In order to achieve the goal of financial stability capital require- 
inents could also have been imposed by national a~tthorities.  However, 
the road to international capital regulation was talcell in the Base1 
Accord of 1988, mainly under the pressure of level playing field con- 
cerns by  large U.S. Banks, which were internationally  active. They 
were in trouble after the Latin American debt crisis, and only willing 
to accept additional regulation by the U.S. Congress if these were also applicable to foreign competitors. Hence, internationalisation and con- 
solidation in the banking sector has given shape to the present system 
of bank capital regulation. 
The req~lireinent  that banks should keep at least eight percent total 
capital to risk weighted assets (Cooke-ratio) was initially only applic- 
able  to  international banks.  Gradually  it  became  the  regulatory 
standard for all banks. In the E.U. these requirements were formally 
incorporated  into  the  E.U.  Solvency  Ratios  and  the  Own  Fund 
Directive for Banking. 
Overall these capital standards have contributed to financial stabil- 
ity. In the 1990s actual capital held by banks increased substantially 
all over the world, as the Basel capital asset ratio became the de facto 
international standard  This presents, howeverj also some drawhacks  -  -  -  - .  - .  .  .  .  .  - - - -.  .  .  - .  .  .  -  - -.  .  .  - .. . -  -  -  - - 
for financial stability. Due to the crude risk categories these standards 
are too low for banks that pursue high-risk strategies. They may be 
also too high for banks with well-diversified portfolios. In this respect 
large banks are not able to benefit wholly from the pooling and diver- 
sification advantages brought about by expansion and consolidation. 
The Basle approach also provided unintended incentives for financial 
innovations and regulatoly arbitrage circumventing the requirements. 
These opportunities are all the more available for large financial play- 
ers. 
The New Capital Framework (NCF) Proposal launched recently by 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision addresses some of these 
problems, that may be particularly  relevant  for larger banks. Based 
upon  advances  in  risk  managenienl  technology  a  more  flexible 
process-oriented  approach is taken. 
In the first pillar of the NCF minimum capital requirements  are 
made more risk sensitive and more comprehensive. A choice is to be 
made between: 
(i)  A standardised approach with compared to the 1988 Basel Accord, 
more sophisticated risk weights based upon external credit rat- 
ings. Larger banks relatively more involved in loans to larger cor- 
porations  whose credit worthiness is rated by outside agencies, 
may benefit more form this option than the smaller banks. 
(ii)  An internal rating based approach that allows banks to use inter- 
nal credit risk assessments. Eventually  statistically based credit 
risk models modelling the aggregate risk of a loan portfolio may 
be developed to determine capital requirements. Such credit risk models are still premature with the current state of the art and 
may only be accessible for large sophisticated banks. 
The second pillar becoining more important in a process-oriented 
approach concerns supervisory review. Instead of being involved in 
setting precise rules  for  calculating capital  adequacy, supervisors 
should concentrate sn  the balks' internal risk maaagement procedures. 
In this respect large financial firms, having a sense of forming clubs 
with  quasi-self-regulatory  aspects,  may  have  an  advantage  (See 
Karacadar and Taylor (2000) and Goodhart (2000)). Eventually it will 
make a capital standard that is two-tier between  larger and smaller 
banks. 
Market discipline  is emphasized in ihe third pillar of the NCF. 
Transparency,  accounting and disclosure standards are required to 
involve market participants and third party reviews at exercising dis- 
cipline on banks. 
Whereas capital adequacy regulation is well developed at the inter- 
national level for banks, this is not the case for securities finns and 
insurance companies. 
Capital req~~irements  play  a similar role to discipline  securities 
forms but are not harmonized at the world level. Within the E.U. coun- 
tries, the Capital Adequacy Directive for market risk applies to both 
banks and investment firms and is essentially equivalent to the Base1 
Accord. The U.S., Canada, Japan and other non-E.U. countries follow 
a different framework. They base their  capital requirements on liq- 
uidity or net capital. Securities finns are required to maintain mini- 
mum levels of highly liquid assets sufficient to satisfy all obligations 
to customers and other inarket participants promptly. 
In the insurance sector capital regulation plays a lesser role coin- 
pared to the importance of technical provisions.  They tend to differ 
across countries. In the E.U., however, they have been harmonised 
through the E.U. Insurance Solvency regulations to cover mainly the 
non-technical risks. The amount of capital that must be held, i.e. the 
solvency margin is derived from objective criteria that are related to 
the overall volume of business  (premiums and claims for non-life 
insurance, mainly mathematical provisions and capital at risk for life 
insurance). The central idea is that firm of the same size are placed 
on  an  equal  competitive  footing  (see  The  Joint  Forum  (2001)). 
The other major system is the US Risk Based Capital (RBC) frame- 
work adopting a capital standard as a threshold  level of capital that identifies cornpallies in need of regulatory attention. lilteresting to 
remark is that it iilcorporates an adjustlneizt for pox-tfolio diversifica- 
tion. As a result, the total capital required is less than the suin of the 
capital form each separate risk. 
Hence, financial coilgloinerates combining banking, insurance and 
securities activities  are subject to a complex regulatory  framework. 
Being subject to different sectoral legislations \vithin the same group 
they are confroilted with  overlaps. Due to differences  in pi-udei~tial 
regulation, and the role of capital in particular, illconsistellcies between 
sectoral legislatioil may give rise to loopholes. Also lacunae exist as 
regulation of risk at the group level is laclting. 
It provides incentives for cross-sectoral risk transfer and regulatory 
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sector lines tlxough securitisation, credit derivates and alternative risk 
transfer. For example iilsurance companies are increasingly acquiring 
credit exposure through credit insurance. Regulatory arbitrage Inay 
also lead to multiple gearing and excessive leverage. First, financial 
conglomerates may weaken capital adequacy and improve their coin- 
petitive positioil by "multiple gearing". It implies that the same capi- 
tal is being couilted twice, for example as a way to satisfy both bank- 
ing and insurance capital requirements (see National Balk of Belgium 
(2002)). Second, excessive leverage occurs when the conglomerate 
issues debt and gives the proceeds as equity to its regulated subsidiary. 
Within the E.U., Directives on the consolidation of ballklinvestment 
groups have imposed specific regulations 011  institutions that perfonn 
siinultaneously banking and securities activities. They introduced the 
practice of coinputing capital adequacy by suiluning the separate cap- 
ital requireinents imposed on the banking book and on the trading book. 
As this directive addresses inaiilly level playing field conceixs, it leaves 
inany  issues ullresolved  from the  financial stability point  of view. 
Heterogeilous financial conglomerate-type groups combining institu- 
tions from the different groups are only covered to a li~liited  extent. 
In an atteinpt to deal with these problems, and in particular with the 
banc assurance phenomenon, recently at the E.U. level a new Directive 
for Financial Congloinerates has beell proposed. First, in order to 
ensure that the objectives of separate supervision of the capital ade- 
quacy of the legal entities are not impaired by conglomeration, it con- 
tains  safeguards  against  certain practices  of  regulatory  arbitrage. 
To avoid double gearing and excessive leverage, capital requirements 
over  bank  loans  and  insurance contracts  are  simply  su~nlned  up following the regulatory practice applied to stand-alone activities, and 
the participations in subsidiaries are partially deducted form capital. 
Second, in order to linlit the risks  of internal contagion and the 
problein linked to coinplexity and lack of transparency, adequate risk 
management procedures have to be set up at the conglonlerate level 
with adequate reporting to supervisory authorities (see National Bank 
of Belgium (2002)). 
Whereas the proposal is still under discussion, some critical obser- 
vatioizs are in order. The proposed directive is nlainly based on level 
playing  field concelms, and iliuch  less on a coinprehensive view of 
financial risks with respect to financial stability. No portfolio consid- 
erations are taken into account to calculate risks, but this is done on 
a stalld=a!Glle basis fGr  the sepaiatc cnti:ies, This being consisierlt with 
the  present  overall  regulatory  regime,  q~lestions,  however,  arise 
whether such a view can be maintained for the future. 
The NCF will allow to include portfolio consideratiolls in calculat- 
ing required risk capital for banking. For insurance one  nay also point 
to the US Risk Based Capital framework that incorporate adjustments 
for portfolio diversifications. The issue is all the more inlportant for 
the assessment of group-wide rislcs and required capital for financial 
conglomerates. Presently at the group level required capital is obtained 
by simply adding up capital for baizltiilg insurance and securities activ- 
ities. As argued above portfolio diversification over different risk-types 
may be one of the driving forces behind the formation of fiilancial 
conglomerates. In principle, multiple different types of risk should be 
consolidated to calculate regulatory capital and risk limits. 
In practice, many firms are increasingly seeking to take a consoli- 
dated enterprise-wide view of risk management. They are increasingly 
inanaging their rislts in structurally coinplex ways. Here are, however, 
still many difficulties associated with such calculations and given the 
preseilt state of risk management technology these approaches reinail1 
still tentative. It inay also explain why the directive organises only 
supplementary supervision, but does not introduce quantitative limits 
as regarding risk concentration. 
B.  Towards new sz~el.visory  st~zlcfzlr-es 
Financial coi~solidation  across countries and financial conglomeration 
across sectors are questioning the whole supervisory architecture and 
organisational structure. Traditionally supervision relied upon an institutional tripartite set- 
up with separate supervision for banks, securities firms and insurance 
companies. Efficient supervision, however, requires that regulators are 
aware of all the activities of a financial group. 
Within this architecture cross-sectoral problems of supervision are 
in first instance to be solved by cooperation  among the supervisory 
authorities. As a result cooperative agreements which take the fom  of 
Memoranda of Understanding (MoU's) are being concluded. Also the 
proposed Financial Conglomerates Directive in the E.U. takes this 
route. In order to limit internal contagion it insists on tight coopera- 
tion between banking  and insurance regulators, in particular  by the 
appointment of a supervisory coordinator.  .  . 
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to achieve many objectives i.e. transparency and fair conduct of finan- 
cial market transactions, the solvency of each financial intermediary 
by micro-prudential supervision, and also aggregate financial stabil- 
ity by macro-prudential supervision of systemic risks. The basic ques- 
tion remains whether an institutionally oriented supervisory architec- 
ture  complemented by MoU's  can adequately deal with all these 
tasks? 
One solution would be to change the present vertical  institution- 
oriented architecture of supervision and to replace it by an horizontal 
objective driven supervisory set-up (see Di Giorgio, De Noia (2000)). 
The achievement of each of the three objectives would be the task of 
a separate supervisory authority. It would clearly allocate responsibil- 
lties for each objective to a specialist supervisor having a comparative 
advantage  in  information  and monitoring.  It  corresponds  to  the 
increasing emphasis on market discipline in risk  control requiring 
more specialised knowledge. The drawback, however, of such a func- 
tional model is that each financial intennediary would have to be 
supervised by three separate supervisors. It also raises difficult issues 
of coordination in supervision among the different authorities. 
A more drastic solution consists in merging the different financial 
supervisors within a single financial supervisory authority. This has 
recently be done in several countries with the Financial Supervisory 
Authority in the U.K. as the most prominent example. Centralisation, 
however, Inay diffuse objectives  and responsibilities.  Moreover,  a 
more decentralised model contains both checks and balances as to be 
burden of regulation and avoids the systemic risk component of a sin- 
gle regulator applying similar risk models for all providers of a par- ticular financial product. A pragmatic solution therefore is to bring the 
different specialist supervisors under one roof. The supervisors then 
only wear different divisional labels within the same regulatory insti- 
tute. While facilitating cooperation, the different divisioils maintain 
sufficient independence to iinpleineilt their own responsibilities. 
In order to deal wit11  the cross-border aspects of supervision also 
many MolJ's have been coi~cl~~ded  on a bilateral basis between coun- 
tries. They provide ill exchange of information and regular meetings 
among the supervisors. At the E.U. level an extensive set of general 
bilateral MoU's have beell concluded lnalting use of the principle of 
mutual recogilitioil and home country control. In addition there are 
also MoU's in place for specific cross border filla~lcial  groups, in par- 
ticu!ar  hetwee~  _RP!~~UIE,  France and the Netherlands. 
The question arises whether this cooperative framework constitutes 
an appropriate basis to deal with the iilcreasingly complex issues at 
hand. From an E.U. perspective the system maintaining a series of 
specialist supervisors in each country  certainly appears as underly 
complex. The nuinber of separate supervisors in each country then 
has to be multiplied by the iluinber of countries. As fiilailcial inarket 
integration in Europe proceeds and the E.U. is enlarged to new mem- 
ber countries, coordination would require an astonishing  amount of 
bilateral MoU's. As a minimum cooperation  is certainly to be rein- 
forced by coilcluding MoU's on a inultilateral basis. Moreover, given 
the difficulties to measure risks and to identify rislts in time, inore 
preventive  action is needed. As separate prudential supervisors may 
riot be capabie ro assessing systemic risits, the question arises whether 
this can be solved by reinforcing cooperation  or should there be an 
additional E.U. i~~volvemei~t  in this respect? 
Coordination at the E.U. level would certainly be simplified by inte- 
grating all supervisors in each country into single financial supervi- 
sory authorities.  This however,  as discussed before, presents  also 
drawbacks as to the efficiency of supervision. 
T11e  more pragmatic alternative by bringing the specialist supervi- 
sors as different divisions uilder one roof would result in  a malrix- 
like organisation frotn an E.U. perspective. At the European level each 
division would be coordinated within a European system. This could 
be achieved starting from the present institutional set up distinguish- 
ing between  banlting,  securities  activities,  and insurance.  In  the 
filnctioilal option it would result in  coordination within a European 
system for financial inarket  transparency,  a European system for micro-prudential supervision of solvency, and a European system for 
macro-prudential supervision of systemic risks. 
Abstraction made of the (unlikely) political feasibility of such com- 
prehensive  system of E.U.-involvement, one may question whether 
this is necessary in the present circumstances. For the many financial 
intermediaries that operate mainly domestically, adequate supervision 
may take place at the national level complemented with MoU's  for 
cross-border aspects. Externalities are unimportant and agency prob- 
lems  due  to  informational  asymmetries  can  be  better  solved by 
national authorities closer to the relevant market. For large financial 
conglomerates, however, externalities tend to be large. When they 
operate internationally European-wide systemic risks are involved. 
There are economies of scale in information gathering so that also 
micro-prudential  supervision cannot be efficiently conducted on a 
national basis6. Supervision by one authority at the E.U. level may 
reveal to be more efficient. 
Hence, can a model be envisaged  in which national supervisors 
function alongside with a Euopean supervisor? It would amount to a 
two-tier  structure  for  prudential  supervision  (see  Schoenmaker 
(1995)). However, it need not result in outright centralisation of super- 
vision on large intermediaries and financial conglomerates at the E.U. 
level. National supervisors may continue to be involved in the super- 
vision of these conglomerates, but a leading coordinating role should 
be developed at the E.U. level. One may also point to the multi-tier 
structure for financial supervision in the U.S. Large banks chartered 
by ilre federal govel~lrnent  are supervised by the board of govemlors 
of the federal system (see Fase, Van Thoor (2000)). 
The  U.S.  example  points  also  to  the  question  of  central bank 
involvement  in prudential  supervision, which is already the case in 
many but not all European countries. In the Euro-area the European 
central bank has independent monetary policy powers to maintain 
price stability, but prudential control and crisis management, includ- 
ing emergency liquidity assistance, and the winding down of financial 
intermediaries belong to the national authorities7. 
However, is the application of the home country control principle 
optimal to deal with systemic risks, when internationally  operating 
firms and large financial conglomerates that may present European- 
wide systemic risks are in need of liquidity? Also the winding down 
of these complex financial institutions may require cross-sector and 
cross-border coordination and coordination. Whereas national  central banks are to be involved in prudential 
supervision at the national level, it is less obvious to give the same for- 
mal policy power to the European Central Bank. The supervision of 
individual intermediaries would imply accountability, also tax money 
would be at stake in case of crisis management, threatening the inde- 
pendence of the European Central Bank. To deal with the cross border 
issues a solution could evenhially be found in giving more autonomy 
to the Banking Supervisory Committee acting as coordinating super- 
visory authority at the E.U. level. 
IV.  GONCLUSlON 
The ongoing changes in the financial landscape towards  consolida- 
tion of financial intermediaries may be analysed not only as resulting 
from expected cost and revenue synergies, but also, in particular for 
the case of financial conglomerates, as driven by the potential of rev- 
enue diversification benefits. 
When this results is improving the overall risk profile of financial 
entities, the financial system may have become more resilient to some 
sources of financial risks. Due to increased interdependencies, how- 
ever, the system-wide transmission of financial shocks is facilitated. 
When the probability that financial shocks will provoke a failure has 
been reduced, the mirror image, however, is that when a failure of a 
financial conglomerate does occur the impact of the  shock will be 
larger. 
These findings certainly warrant closer attention of policy-makers 
for prudential regulation as financial conglomerates present particular 
problems with respect to the existing safety net policies and capital 
adequacy regulation. Concerning the proposed Directive on Financial 
Conglomerates in the E.U. some critical questions remain as to the 
approach taken to the consolidation of risks. Also at the E.U. level a 
new institutional set-up with a two-tier supervisory structure for the 
larger financial players should be envisaged to deal appropriately with 
the potential of European-wide systemic risks. 
NOTES 
1.  The OECD defines systemic risk broadly  as a risk that occurs as a result of the cur- 
rent or future functioning of major systems  leading to complex illteractioils which 
therefore lead to increasing risks. 2.  In a sh~dy  by Wyman & Co (2001), Stlic/l.  oil  tile Risk Piufile ai7d  Ccpita1.4deqzicic~~  of 
Fiilcrl~cinl  Coi7gloii~ei~crte.s,  the underlying benefits of diversification range from more 
than one third to a inodest 15 percent, as is referred to in The Joint Fomln Report 2001, 
on Risk Management Practices and Regulatory Capital Cross-sectoral comparisons. 
3.  This is also suggested in case by case studies conducted for Financial Conglolnerates 
in Belgium. Siinulation studies provided evidence for risk diversification benefits  of 
the particular congloineratcs that were folmed. (See Dc Houwer (1996)). 
4. If the lnarlcet thinks that banks have sinlilar asset structures or are highly  intercou- 
nected equity rctums should be highly correlated (see Group of Tell (2001)). 
5.  Recently, however, some new arguments for struclural ineasures limiting compctilion 
have bceil advanced. (See Hellman, Murdoch, Stiglitz (1999)). 
6.  Whcn colltrolled by differ-eilt  principals conlmoil agency problerns arise. With princi- 
pals having collflicting objectives, the agent will try to give different signals to each 
principal leading to an inefficient outcoine (see Smcts. Van Cayseele (1996)). 
7. The ECB can well act in an advisory and coordinating capacity in the prudeiltial super- 
vision of banks. Also, the ECB needs to be consulted by the Commuility and its mem- 
ber states on supervisory matters in its field of competence, i.e. in so far as they mate- 
rially iilflueilce the stability of financial markets. 
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